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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

-------------------------------------------------------------In The Matter Of The Adoption Of
KARLA JEAN ANDERSON, a minor,
JAMES REED HALL and
BRENDA M. HALL,
Appellants,

Case No. 14 7.05

v.
THOMAS LeROY ANDERSON,
Respondent.

-------------------------------------------------------------APPELLANTS' BRIEF

-------------------------------------------------------------·
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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellants' appeal from the decision of the District
Court of Uintah County, State of Utah, denying appellants' Petition for Adoption.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On May 12, 1976 a hearing was held in the District
Court in and for Uintah County, the Honorable J, Robert Bullock
presiding, on appellants' motion to adopt Karla Jean Anderson
without permission from Karla Jean Anderson's natural father on
the grounds of abandonment.

The Petition was denied on May 14,

1976.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek to have the lower court's decision
vacated and judgment entered in appellants' favor declaring that
Karla Jean Anderson's natural father abandoned her within the
meaning of Sec. 78-30-1, Utah Code Ann., and that appellants'
Petition to Adopt Karla Jean Anderson without her natural fatlile.~ 1 s
consent be granted.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A Decree of Divorce was entered on March 13, 1972,
granting a final Decree of Divorce between Thomas L. Anderson
'
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and petitioner, Brenda M, Hall, formerly known as Brenda M.
Anderson, parents of Karla Jean Anderson.

custody of the child

was awarded to the then Brenda M. Anderson with visiting rights,
granted to Thomas L. Anderson and a further requirement of
child support required of Thomas L. Anderson.

In 1972 Brenda

M. Anderson married James R. Hall.
From the time of the granting of the divorce decree
until the present time Thomas L. Anderson made a total of $150
child support payments as the Court stated in its Findings of
Fact.

The Court further found that at all times pertinent to

this case Thomas L. Anderson knew where petitioners w_ere living.
Finally, the Court found that the existence of the natural father
is totally unknown to the child

and that Karla Jean Anderson

looks upon James R. Hall, petitioner, as her father.
ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT THOMAS L. ANDERSON
HAD ABANDONED HIS DAUGHTER.
Sec. 78-30-5, Utah Code Ann., as amended in 1965, pro·
vides that when a child is deserted by its parents it may be
adopted without the natural parent's consent.

The obvious intent

of the legislature is to allow a child the happiness and emotional stability provided by a warm and loving family unit with·
out delay or undue anguish when parents abandon children.

The
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entire statute is structured to provide the greatest benefit to
the child in circumstances where the child is receiving no emotional support or other kinds of support from its natural parents.
The circumstances envisioned by the statute are precisely the kinds of circumstances that exist in the case at bar.
Petitioner, Mrs. Hall, testified (p. 4,5,7, TT) that Mr. Anderson
had made no attempt, save one immediately after the divorce
decree, to even see the child.

Furthermore, she testified that

Mr. Anderson had been in the area where the Halls were living
and never made an attempt even to use the phone to call and
inquire as to the child's well-being.

This is supported by Mr.

Hall's testimony, who testified that he lived in Dutch John,

/A*t-J

Arizona, and met Mr. Anderson while he too worked in the same town
for the Forest Service (p. 11, TT).

This testimony was not con-

troverted by Mr. Anderson, nor indeed was any evidence introduced
to show that when Mr. Anderson was in the vicinity of the Hall's
he made any attempt to visit or call about the child's welfare.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to understand how a parent
can claim love and affection for a child and yet make no attempt
when in the vicinity of the child's residence to make some physical contact, even if only a phone call.

Certainly a medical

problem that would not have prevented Mr. Anderson from traveling
would not have prevented him from a simple phone call.

Yet the record

is devoid of any such attempts.
Similarly, Mr. Anderson testified that he has remarried.
wife and two children and supports them but still neglects
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the child he claims to love and cherish.

Irregularly and infre-

quently, insignificant and insubstantial gestures have been made,
amounting over a three year period to virtually nothing in view
of the paramount and pressing needs of a child in the very forrna·
ti ve and crucial years of her life, when substantial and effectiv:
emotional needs must be met.
all of Karla's needs.

During these

y~ars

the Halls met

Mr. Anderson was never there.

Instead in the early part of January 1973, Mr. Anderson
writes Mrs. Hall requesting permission to use his daughter as a
"tax break."

Certainly, this is communication to the mother,

but the~ of communication sufficient to warrant a finding of
love and affection?

In June 1973 another letter appears in the

record written by Mr. Anderson arguing payments which were not
made.

The record will also show that up to May 26, 1973 cornmuni·

cation can be said to be regular.

But after the June 1973 letter

from Thomas to Brenda there is a virtual dearth of communication.
No substantiation appears in the record for the allegec
Christmas money of 12-16-75, and Mrs. Hall denied receiving it.
Since the answers to the interrogatories were filed on the 23d
day of February, 1976, and since Mr. Anderson kept meticulous
records of his communications with the Halls, it must be presumed that this payment is an error.

Consequently, from June

1973 until December 19, 1975, when this petition was filed, Mr.

Anderson had sent only five insubstantial communciations to
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daughter yet claims to have saved $1500 for her (p. 17, TT) and
again no verification appears in the record either by bank statement or letter for this amount of savings.
On the other hand, there are two letters written by
Thomas Anderson's wife in 1975, one in May 1975 and one presumably after that,

(Court record, p. 26).

It is interesting to

note that these are the only two communications in the record
although Mr. Anderson by his testimony would have us believe that
there were many communications,

And at least the first of the

two letters came with the May 9, 1975 gift.

Consequently, the

record before the Court shows six communications by the Andersons
from June 1973 to the December 1975 filing of the petitfbn.
Furthermore, the last four communications, the signing
and writing of checks and letters had been handled, accoraing to
the record, by Mrs. Anderson and not by Mr. Anderson whe is in
fact the natural parent.

We, therefore, have evidence that in

that period she was interested in the child, but there is'no
evidence that the natural parent, Mr. Anderson, was interested
in Karla.
In re Adoption of Walton, 123 Utah 380, 259 P.2d 881
(1953), and In re Adoption of Jameson, 20 Ut, 2d 53, 432 P.2d
881 (1967) state what the law is with respect to Sec. 78-30-5,
Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended in 1965.

Appellants do not

argue that these cases are in error, but simply that the case
at bar does not fit within the rule of those two cases.
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Utah case law does not require that the natural parenti
affirmatively state that he is abandoning his children.

The

i

;

two cases cited merely indicate that abandonment can be determined and inferred from the natural parent's actions.

In

Jameson, supra, for example, the Court held that incarceration
is not abandonment.

"We believe and so hold that the language

of the statute means an intentional abandonment of the child
rather than a separation due to misfortune or misconduct."
20 Ut. 2d at 54.
The misconduct in the Jameson case does not apply in
the present instance and misfortune has not been defined though
under whatever definition, appellants contend that this case
does not fit the circumstances.

It was not misfortune that kept:

Mr. Anderson from visiting or calling to inquire about his
daughter when he was in her vicinity.
or want.

It was lack of desire

It was not misfortune that kept defendant from writing

to his daughter, but lack of interest.

It was not misfortune

that kept support payments from being sent to Karla, but lack
of concern.

Mr. Anderson supports a family now.

Furthermore,

if, in fact, Mr. Anderson saved $1500, that amount is equal to
2-1/2 years of child support.

How can he claim inability to pay

child support and at the same time allege that he saved it?
Where is the money?

Where, in fact, is the proof that he saved

it?
- 6 -
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Clearly, this case does not fit the Jameson rule because, in fact, Mr. Anderson had abandoned his little girl and
left her to be cared for by others.
Similarly, with respect to the Walton, supra, case,
the case at bar does not fit the facts of Walton.

Effectively,

from June 1973 to December 1975, Mr. Anderson abandoned his child.
No support was paid during that time; no attempt at visiting
the child or calling the child was made even when in the vicinity;
no attempt was made to write to the child except for five gifts
in nearly 2-1/2 years when the thought occurred to Mr. Anderson.
In effect, others were left to care for Karla while Mr. Anderson
might send a candygram for Easter.

One is left to wonder whe-

there or not the circumstances would have changed had Mr, Anderson
not married his present wife who seems to.be pressing for the
child.
Appellant submits that a line must be drawn somewhere
if the statute is to have any meaning.

Can five insignificant

gifts over a 2-1/2 year period withstand an argument of no support, attempts at visiting, or even communication?

What then

does abandonment mean?
As in the lower court, apparently Mr. Anderson will
plead repentance.

But is that fair for the seven year old child?

Her feelings in the present home, after four years, are deep
and committed.

She knows only one family and feels the security,
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warmth, and tenderness of one family unit.

The child was three

when she entered the unit and is now seven.

Her entire life is

to be disrupted now because one man sent five gifts in 2-1/2
years?

Are there not vested rights of happiness, peace, tran-

quility, security, and love present here that supersede the
I

tenuous threads of repentance presented and the hollow ring of i
I
precious few gifts?
At no time did the Halls return these gifts.

I

Further·[

more, the record does not support the Andersons' contention
that the Halls indicated that they no longer wanted the child
support.

The very closest the Halls came to such a pronounce-

ment was a letter dated January 12, 1973 (C.R., p. 29):
"As far as Karla goes
care of and has what
happy and contented,
just step out of the
Mrs. Hall's)

she's taken well
she needs and is
so why don~t you
picutre!" (emphasis

But the very next paragraph reads:
"Either pay your child support - or just
forget the whole thing. If Karla would
have had to depend on you she would have
to starve to death long before this!"
Six months later Mr. Anderson writes and discusses the
payments without a hint of any disclaimer by the Halls.

I

Clearly this case does not meet the fundamental tests[
of Walton and, therefore, appellants contend that Mr. Anderson
abandoned his little girl and this Court should so declare.
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,....-

CONCLUSION
The evidence clearly indicates that Mr, Anderson
1) did not pay child support; 2} made no attempts to visit
the child; 3) and made no attempt to communicate with the
child except for five meager gifts in 2-1/2 years.

Appellants,

therefore, submit that Mr. Anderson had abandoned his little
girl and that even though now he may be repentant, more harm
than good would be done by dismissing appellants• petition.
Therefore, appellants pray the Court to find that Mr. Anderson
had abandoned his daughter Karla Jean and grant appellants'
Petition to Adopt Karla.

b

Att
370 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief to Marc

'SI!· -

Mascaro, Attorney for Respondent, 7417 South State Street,Midvale, UT 84047, this 30th day of October, 1976, postage
prepaid.
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